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Abstract 
The effectiveness of systematic and targeted investment in infrastructure, particularly transport, has divided opinion about the 
effectiveness of such spending as a tool for driving economies out of recession by creating jobs and economic growth. Ireland 
responded to a clamor for greatly increased investment in its infrastructure during its prolonged economic boom from the late 
1990’s through to 2008/9.  Empirical evidence is now available on which to assess the efficacy of that prolonged programme of 
infrastructure investment that was brought to an abrupt halt in the last few years following the onset of the worldwide financial 
and economic crisis in 2009. In the US, the idea of spending on public works projects like road-building as economic stimulus 
has been a mainstay of jobs proposals from both Congressional Democrats and the White House in recent years. The evidence 
from Ireland provides arguably a unique opportunity to evaluate the economic and related impacts of a massive spending 
programme that was the equivalent to the US investing more than $275 billion per annum for 10 years on transport infrastructure. 
The arguments for infrastructure spending among interest groups, lobbyists and many economists and the evidence for it stem 
from a variety of analytical tools and empirical evidence. This paper evaluates the Irish experience over the last decade on the 
basis of regional and census data as well as other secondary evidence and relevant literature. It also reviews the approaches and 
methods employed in and outcomes reported from  the US, based largely on secondary evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
A new stretch of motorway almost 60km in length is due to open on the western seaboard of Ireland in 2018, an 
element of an unprecedented programme of road investment under the Transport 21 programme initiated during the 
Celtic Tiger phase in the development of the Irish economy. However, the go ahead for the current construction was 
given after the onset of both global recession and the collapse of the Irish economy in 2008/9. More surprising is the 
projected use of the new road, officially put initially at no more than 20% of capacity rising to no more than 25% by 
2030. The project was given the go ahead in part to act as stimulus to the regional economy. However, its projected 
use begs questions about the efficacy of that spending given the constraints on the public funds generally. 
Calls for investment in infrastructure have been heard frequently in recent years as the global and national 
economies have been faced with financial and economic challenges not experienced in the Western democracies for 
more than eighty years. Opinion on this strategy as a tool for driving the economy out of recession and creating jobs 
however, is divided, particularly in the US (Congressional Research Service, 2011; Executive Office of the 
President, 2011).  Support for such spending along with various fiscal measures is typically ascribed to a Keynesian 
perspective in contrast to a monetarist approach focusing on reducing public expenditure. Such a distinction is 
somewhat artificial given for instance, the UK Government’s encouragement to infrastructure spending, albeit 
funded or at least financed by large contributions from the private sector.  
It is not only in times such as these and with a focus on fiscal austerity that there have been calls for such 
investment to address infrastructure deficits. Ireland increased investment in its infrastructure during its prolonged 
economic boom through to 2008/9. The 60km Gort – Tuam motorway represents continuation of that programme, 
dubbed Transport 21.   Empirical evidence is now available on which to assess the efficacy of that programme, 
brought to an abrupt halt following the onset of the worldwide financial and economic crisis in 2009.  
Transport spending under the US stimulus program has formed only part of a much larger set of initiatives 
embracing not only investment in infrastructure but a wide variety of other measures including fiscal reforms and 
recurrent spending programs. This makes it difficult to isolate the effects of spending on transport. Moreover, it is 
arguably too soon to draw comprehensive conclusions on the impacts and effectiveness of the US program. While 
evidently of very different scale the Irish case study provides arguably a unique opportunity to evaluate the 
economic and related impacts of a massive spending programme (relative to the size of the economy) that was the 
equivalent to the US investing more than $275 billion per annum for 10 years on transport infrastructure. 
The arguments for infrastructure spending stem from a variety of analytical tools and empirical evidence. This 
paper seeks to identify the implications of approaches to informing government decisions in times of austerity. It 
begins with an overview of the arguments promoted and evidential base for boosting infrastructure spending in the 
US that emerged in 2008/9. The paper also offers an overview of the short term outcomes reported from the US. It 
then turns to consideration of the Irish experience over the last decade on the basis of regional and census data as 
well as other secondary evidence and relevant literature. 
It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to test an hypothesis that setting aside the merits of a Keynesian or 
monetarist policies, choice of tools with which to base investment decisions  will have an important bearing on 
outcomes in terms of economic performance as well as transport and travel behaviour/. The merits of investment in 
infrastructure under both the US stimulus program and in the case of Ireland has been informed by a variety of tools, 
including aggregate econometric models.  This paper reviews the approaches and methods employed in appraising 
and linked to such investment outcomes, with particular reference to the US..  Informed by the US literature and 
with reference to UK experience, it goes on to proffer some insights into the role of selected approaches to decisions 
on investment for securing value for money from scarce public funds in times of austerity, with particular reference 
to the Irish experience. 
2. Calls for stimulus funding for infrastructure in the US and Ireland 
In the US, the idea of spending on public works projects like road-building as economic stimulus has been a 
mainstay of job proposals from both Congressional Democrats and the White House in recent years. In February 
2009, the U.S. Congress approved the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. President Obama’s FY 2013 
Budget proposed a bold plan to renew and expand America’s infrastructure. The plan included a $50 billion up-front 
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investment connected to a $476 billion six-year reauthorisation of the surface transportation program and the 
creation of a National Infrastructure Bank. 
An economic analysis of infrastructure investment prepared by the Department of The Treasury with the Council 
of Economic Advisers in March 2012, affirmed the economic effects of infrastructure investment reaffirming that 
this was an ideal time to increase the US Government’s investment in infrastructure (US Department of the 
Treasury, 2012). However, it cautioned that not every infrastructure project is worth the investment. Moreover, in 
recent years very little direct private investment has been made in the US highway and transit systems because 
conventional methods adopted to fund infrastructure lack attractive financial mechanisms to attract private 
investment from the private sector. Opponents have questioned the US Government’s approach, its efficiency at 
creating jobs and its cost.  
Shaping outcomes from such expenditure depends on the speed (or lack thereof) with which infrastructure 
spending is actually delivered as well as underlying macroeconomic and related conditions when construction takes 
place and projects come to fruition. Moreover, a distinction between short term and long term effects tends to reflect 
the scale of multiplier effects as well as scale of the investment. In past recessions, infrastructure projects have taken 
so long to get off the ground that their effects were only felt after recovery had begun, claims the American 
Enterprise Institute. Given how relatively recently such measures were introduced, inevitably at the time of writing 
evaluation of the impact of the 2009 Act has proven problematic.  
It is not only in times of fiscal austerity that there have been repeated calls to address so called infrastructure 
deficits. Ireland is one such country which sought to boost its competiveness during its prolonged economic boom 
from the late 1990’s through to 2008/9. In the next section we review the evidence of short term effects of the US 
Stimulus Program on the American economy before reviewing evidence of the proportionality much larger 
Transport 21 Investment Programme in Ireland for that country’s economy and transport systems. 
3. Short term effects of infrastructure spending in the US stimulus program on the American economy  
Most claims of success or failure arising from stimulus spending in the US have been based on application of the 
same statistical tools used to argue for or against the stimulus in the first place. The basis for advocating 
infrastructure spending is reflected in the so called multiplier effect in the wider economy. Unfortunately, direct 
evaluation of the impact of the 2009 Act in the US has proven difficult. In this section we provide an overview of the 
available evidence for the impact of investment infrastructure for the wider economy. 
The debate on the extent to which economic benefits arise from transport investment continues to cause debate 
and controversy. In the US, notwithstanding the existence of Government guidelines for the application of 
conventional economic appraisal tools as set out in 2014 Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance for Tiger Grant Applicants 
(Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 2014), this debate has been informed in particular by outputs from 
aggregate macro-economic/ econometric models of varying degrees of sophistication.  These have achieved 
prominence against the backdrop of the financial and economic crises faced by many countries. Elsewhere the range 
of tools to address the relationship between transport investment and the wider economy also includes market-based 
techniques as well as enhanced appraisal, evaluation and assessment procedures based on economic cost-benefit 
analysis. The various approaches have their own limitations. Econometric studies must allow for the presence of  
“endogeneity”, the effect of which can be to shape the apparent effectiveness of stimulus spending. The extent to 
which the many tools can deal with endogeneity varies, and in particular their ability to isolate the independent 
effects of particular explanatory variables. In addition to considering the basis of these approaches it is informative 
to review key outputs or derived indicators for projected/actual economic impacts to assist in building up a picture of 
possible or actual outcomes.  
A review of US studies suggests half to two thirds employing econometric tools have identified a significant 
positive effect attributable to the stimulus program (Chodorow et al, 2012; Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2011; Le Duc and 
Wilson, 2012; Wilson, 2011) while the balance identified no significant impact (Conley and Dupor, 2011; Taylor, 
2011) . Among macroeconomic model based studies the findings offer even greater support to the stimulus funding 
program (Heintz et al, 2009; Page and Reichling, 2011; Blinder and Zandi, 2010; CEA, 2010). However, it can be 
argued that these studies typically do not allow for real world changes but represent projections for a given set of 
assumed conditions that have been subject to changes in the intervening period.  Investigation of these and other 
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papers suggests that the typical range for multipliers for infrastructure investment lies between 1 and 3 with costs per 
job created/secured between $33,000 and $100,000. Other reviews suggest a much greater range in performance 
with De Rugy (2011) for instance claiming a range for multipliers for stimulus funding between 3.7 and –2.88. 
Similarly Le Duc and Wilson (2012) claim a significant difference in multipliers for the short term compared to the 
longer term quoting a range of 1 and 3 in the short term and between 3 and 7 over six to eight years. 
This review suggests that investment in infrastructure as part of a larger stimulus program can have an impact on 
the wider economy. However, the wide variation in findings from  a variety of studies reliant on broadly two 
approaches poses major question marks about the precision of the most influential tools being employed which in 
turn suggests weaknesses in understanding of the processes linking such spending with final outcomes in the 
economy.  
In the case of recent US experience this may reflect in part the relatively short period since the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act was passed and the stimulus program launched. In part it may reflect the 
confounding effects of different elements of the stimulus program and the relatively modest scale of the transport 
infrastructure spend within the overall package. It is for this reason that the next section of this paper considers the 
case of Ireland’s Transport 21 Programme launched in 2006 and that country’s largest and most sustained 
investment in transport infrastructure intended to cover a 10 year period until 2015. However, this highly ambitious 
programme equivalent to some twenty times spending per capita in the United States was brought to a shuddering 
halt by Ireland’s sudden and very deep economic recession after 2008 that saw spending in transport slashed after 
2011. 
4. What was Ireland’s Transport 21 
Ireland’s Transport 21 Programme, estimated as €34.4 billion at its launch in 2005, was intended to boost the 
country’s economic competitiveness during its long economic growth phase. In the case of major roads the Irish 
Government adopted an approach in line with US Federal Highway Standards Manual based on targets for road 
quality rather than the output of a planned transport strategy informed by European style investment appraisal 
procedures, for instance the UK ‘Webtag’ tool kit. (Department for Transport, 2013a) 
Transport 21 or ‘T21’ was an infrastructure funding programme for the period 2006-2015, key elements of which 
are contained in the provisions of  the Irish National Development Plan 2007 – 13 (NDP) and consistent with the 
National Spatial Strategy (NSS) 2002 – 2020.   The key commitment from the Irish Government was an 
unprecedented guarantee of capital funding for ten years, equivalent to the US investing more than $275 billion per 
annum for 10 years on transport infrastructure. The T21 Programme, however, was collated without a 
comprehensive strategic investment appraisal although the programme for the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) was 
based upon an extensively researched and tested strategy. At the launch it was claimed that, T21 would maintain and 
enhance economic competitiveness, promote balanced regional growth throughout the State and enhance quality of 
life. Seven years after the launch of T21 Ireland the Government could not afford to spend at the rate envisaged by 
T21 – an average of € 3 billion per annum. It was in these circumstances the Chartered Institute of Logistics and 
Transport (CILT) commissioned a review of progress up to 2010 (Smyth, Humphreys & Wood, 2010).  The CILT 
review analysed how transport policy and investment in infrastructure should proceed in the new economic reality 
that confronts Ireland today. The review applied the new economic context to the original Transport 21 package, and 
identified those projects which will best assist economic recovery and a return to growth. 
5. The mid-term review of T21 - 2010 
5.1 T21 budget and outturn spending 
Planned capital spending under T21 totalled almost € 14 billion for the period 2006 – 2010, with outturn spending 
exceeding planned spend each year excepting 2009. To inform an understanding of the distribution of spending and 
benefits attributable to the T21 Programme each identifiable project was allocated to one of four prototypical area 
types: Inter-urban;– e.g. national road schemes, rail schemes outside Dublin and inter-city coach purchases; Greater 
Dublin; Other Cities – i.e. Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford; Towns and Rural – the remainder.  Key features of 
33 Austin Smyth et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  8 ( 2015 )  29 – 40 
the profile of capital spending indicate: expenditure on national roads was three times the level of expenditure on 
public transport; expenditure on inter-urban schemes accounted for almost three quarters of the spend; road 
expenditure on inter-urban schemes had been running at eight times expenditure in other areas; almost two thirds of 
public transport expenditure took place in Dublin with the majority of the balance on inter-urban  corridors; and 
almost two thirds of public transport expenditure was attributable to rail with a further one third on LRT and only 
one twelfth on buses. The outturn estimates suggest the greatest beneficiaries of the investment were population 
centres located in the main interurban corridors, which includes the Capital, Dublin (Figure 1). 
 
Fig 1: T21 Capital Spending Profile 
According to the Mid Term Review, substantial progress had been made on delivering the T21 as scheduled in 
the case of roads. By contrast the largest public transport projects, e.g. Metro North and West and DART 
Underground, were still at the planning consent or design stage.  
5.2 T21 Programme level of service outcomes to 2010 
Major Inter Urban (MIU) schemes have provided motorway or high class dual carriageway connecting Dublin to 
Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford.  The T21 2009 Annual Report reported the following travel time reductions 
arising from the projects implemented by that date: Dublin – Belfast 30 minutes; Dublin – Cork 85 minutes; Dublin - 
Galway 75 minutes; Dublin – Limerick 70 minutes; and Dublin – Waterford 60 minutes. In contrast Inter-urban 
travel by rail showed very limited if any travel time improvements.  Within the Greater Dublin Area capacity 
upgrades were made to the existing LUAS light rail lines and the DART and Cork Mainline suburban heavy rail 
lines.   
5.3 T21 Programme impacts – travel demand, modal split and congestion 
The major impact of T21 has been to encourage increased commuting to Dublin by private car mainly due to the 
significantly higher speeds afforded by the burgeoning motorway network. T21 projects were expected to have 
reduced congestion on the M50 around Dublin, and longer-distance commuter routes to Galway, Limerick, 
Waterford; and public transport overloading on LUAS and Dublin Bus in particular.  Major inter-urban motorways 
and radial capacity improvements in Dublin’s public transport network have probably underpinned the city’s 
economic competitiveness and marginally improved the quality of life of its residents.  T21 projects have had limited 
impacts on modal split. 
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5.4 Compatibility with objectives 
In undertaking the Mid Term Review of T21 a difficulty arose because little information was available 
concerning Government objectives. The objectives of T21, as stated in progress reports and in ministerial speeches, 
were chiefly about dealing with an infrastructure investment deficit (Speech by Minister of Transport at the launch 
of T21, T21 2006 progress report). To assess T21 the review looked to the assessment criteria set out in the Irish 
Department of Transport’s (DoT) own guidelines for decision making published in 2007, a year after the launch of 
T21  (Department of Transport, 2007).  The guidelines set out the following five high-level criteria: Economy – 
including transport efficiency and other wider economic impacts; Safety –the number and severity of personal 
injuries; Environment – including air quality, water and noise and impacts on the natural and built environments; 
Accessibility and social inclusion – affecting both vulnerable groups and deprived geographic areas; and Integration 
– with transport networks, land-use and other government policy.  
5.5 Assessment of T21 against key objectives 
Informed by the Government’s guidelines and against challenges previously identified in “Transporting Ireland” 
(Smyth, 2006) a high level strategic assessment was undertaken of performance of the Transport 21 programme as 
summarised in Table 1. In relation specifically to the competitiveness and economic growth, funding and financial, 
and spatial development performance criteria the following observations arising from the 2010 review are pertinent. 
 
Competitiveness and Economic Growth  
Many elements of the T21 Programme are unlikely to contribute significantly to overall competitiveness of the 
Irish economy.  By reducing travel times the MIU road programme is likely to have yielded most economic benefits 
to date but those mainly involve redistribution of relative competitiveness within the country rather than contributing 
significantly to overall national competitiveness. Large scale public transport investment in the GDA could 
ultimately contribute to a more efficient city region. 
 
Funding and Financial 
The review employed four scaling levels to take account of total, whole life costing, taking account of capital and 
revenue costs. A number of the schemes were procured using Public Private Partnerships. The review identified 
payments in excess of €300 million due from government / National Roads authority (NRA) to private partners over 
the next 25 years (source NRA website).  With travel times by road now faster than by rail for almost all intercity 
corridors, rail almost inevitably will suffer a steady decline with further adverse consequences for the subsidy 
required to sustain the network, in the absence of significant improvements in average speeds. 
 
Spatial Development 
The T21 road programme has tended to promote further spatial dispersal and rural isolation as it becomes 
increasingly expensive to sustain local public transport. Network expansion of Dublin Suburban Rail in the longer 
term is likely to contribute significantly to promoting sustainability. In relation to energy and environmental 
sustainability the positive impacts of the MIU improvements are at the expense of detrimental environmental/quality 
of life impacts. 
6. Extended analysis of T21 impacts on the Irish economy  
Following release of Ireland’s 2011 Census figures, in addition to regional and county income/Gross Value 
Added (GVA) statistics, inspection of the trends in both GVA and total income per capita provides insight into the 
spatial impact of the Transport 21 programme. It would be reasonable to anticipate that major inter urban motorway 
projects would promote economic convergence with the country’s capital region, the effective engine of the national 
economy and divergence from other areas not served by new infrastructure of a similar type and scale. A review of 
the relevant indices on GVA per person and personal income per person at county and sub-regional levels reveals no 
apparent impact attributable to the major interurban investment programme (Figures 2 and 3). Indeed, the evidence 
35 Austin Smyth et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  8 ( 2015 )  29 – 40 
for the period from 2002 to 2010 suggests that other more peripheral areas, locations not directly benefiting from this 
investment have performed relatively better than areas directly linked by the enhanced motorway network. GVA and 
Income data for 2011, just published, reaffirms these findings. 
Table 1: Compatibility with T21 Challenges 
 Compatibility with T21 Challenges 
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National        
Major Inter Urban Roads √ XXX XX XX √ X Generates 
additional traffic 
Other Inter Urban Roads √ X X X √ 0 Relatively low 
cost 
Inter-City Rail √ XX √ √ √√ √ Will require 
increasing 
subsidy 
Regional Rail √ X √ √ √ √ Contributes to a 
range of 
objectives  
Bus services Other Cities √ X √ √ 0 √√ Provides 
improved access 
for physically 
impaired people 
and non-car 
owners 
Bus services in towns 0 X √ √ 0 √√ 
New Coach fleet 0 X √ 0 √ √√ 
Regional Airports 0 X X 0 0 0 Services may 
require subsidy 
Greater Dublin Area        
Commuter Rail √ X √√ √ √√ √ Contributes to a 
range of 
objectives 
DART Underground √√√ XXX √√√ √√ √√ √√ Widest travel and 
spatial impacts 
LUAS Capacity √ X √ √ √ √ Contributes to a 
range of 
objectives 
LUAS Cross City √√ X √√ √√ √ √ Wide travel and 
spatial impacts  
METRO North √ XXX √ √ √√ √ Significant spatial 
impacts  
Quality Bus Corridors √ 0 √√ √ √ √ corridor modal 
shift 
M50 Upgrade √ XX X XX √ X Generates 
additional traffic 
Notes: Scores range from √√√= highly compatible to XXX highly incompatible. 0 = neutral – insignificant or no impact: Assumes do nothing 
base and no joint impacts. 
7. Perspectives on Transport 21 
Transport 21 was presented as “an integrated solution to Ireland’s current and evolving transport needs”. Despite 
the complexity of needs, the overall programme did not undergo a strategic investment appraisal. It is evident that 
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the major element of the programme encompassing radical upgrading of the road network has yet to demonstrate 
significant economic impact in terms of convergence in income levels or GVA between areas now served by the new 
motorway network and the capital region. 
There were also contradictions between elements of the programme, in particular how they sought to address both 
the economic and environmental challenges, faced by Ireland as well as social inclusion and spatial development 
needs. This had significant unintended consequences, both those that were anticipated (Smyth, 2006) and those that 
were not expected, stemming from the financial and economic crises after 2009. Moreover, although most major 
inter-urban road schemes were constructed on time (and budget), in contrast, the more complex rail schemes, 
particularly urban projects, were programmed to be built later. Many were behind programme in 2010 and have now 
been postponed indefinitely with the unfolding financial and economic crises.  
 
Fig 2: Indices of GVA per person in Ireland at Basic Prices (2002, 2006,2010) 
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Dramatic time savings by road are bound to encourage road traffic growth and will generate more competition for 
rail. Complete uncertainty now arises over completion of the remaining public transport investment under T21 even 
in the longer term. Energy and Emissions were arguably the most significant omission from T21. Realistically 
emissions will rise with the re-emergence of more favourable economic conditions, the extent of which will depend 
upon progress achieved in decarbonisation of the transport sector. These concerns were subsequently recognised by 
the DoT and have set goals for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and sustainability. 
 
Fig 3: Indices of Total Income per person In Ireland (2002, 2006, 2010) 
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8. Observations on the significance of assessment tools and appraisal frameworks in approaching large scale 
publicly funded infrastructure decisions   
It has long been argued that transport is the key to economic development.  The mobility of people, freight and 
levels of territorial accessibility are central to this relationship. This points to the impact transport can have on 
economic development, social welfare and the environment (Gutierrez and Martin, 2011). Transportation impacts 
the economy at many levels: Global, transnational, national, specific locations, and across many sectors. The 
literature suggests good transport infrastructure is vital for regional development (Graham, 1998; Vickerman, 1995).  
However, while quality transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for development but it is not a sufficient 
condition for growth. It may not be as significant (in terms of first order effects) as the presence of positive 
economic conditions (e.g. agglomeration and labour market economies) or indeed political circumstances within 
which transport decisions must be taken. Transport infrastructure investment complements these other conditions, 
which must also be met if further economic development is to take place.  
There are three main elements to the total economic impact that may be generated by infrastructure investment. 
First is the impact on competition in the affected areas, second benefits through agglomeration, and third is the 
impact on linkages, in particular the labour market.  Emphasis on markets will demonstrate agglomeration can take 
place and continue without a process of self-balance setting in. However, the impact of any particular reduction of 
transport costs cannot be determined in advance. It depends on prevailing transport costs, the existing agglomeration, 
market size, the extent of scale economies and backward and forward linkages. 
It has been noted that in the US, while government guidelines exist for the execution of economic appraisals 
similar to those that apply in the UK, in the context of a severe economic recession increased significance has been 
attributed to a range of macro-economic tools. In contrast the standard approach to transport appraisal in the UK 
continues to rely mainly on a well-specified cost-benefit analysis to capture all the economic impacts of an 
infrastructure investment (Department for Transport, 2013b). In recent times however, the concept of wider 
economic benefits (not normally found in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis) has routinely entered the debate on 
infrastructure investment, particularly for larger investments.  Moreover, macroeconomic studies have shown strong 
positive links between the aggregate level of infrastructure investment and economic performance as measured by 
such indicators as GDP, productivity growth or employment.  However, while the direct impacts and benefits from 
transport are more tangible, reflected in increases in market size and reductions in travel time and costs, the role of 
transport infrastructure in promoting development is difficult to estimate quantitatively 
       Macroeconomic models and conventional transport assessment tools, however, have different objectives. 
While the former relate overall changes in macroeconomic performance to aggregate investment in infrastructure 
most transport investment decisions are limited to local improvements. Typically these have been assessed by 
methods focusing on user benefits, especially user time savings, relief of congestion and reduction in accidents and 
environmental impacts. However, decisions based on cost-benefit type procedures depend critically on the accurate 
measurement of future demands and often fail to allow for generated or induced traffic. Furthermore it can be argued 
conventional investment appraisal does not encompass interactions between transport and the activities which use 
transport. The findings from any such an exercise could differ if the level of competition in the wider economy 
differed in the locations affected by the investment. The problem of imperfect competition has been usually ignored, 
although this shortcoming may be viewed as not serious where only minor accessibility changes result.  
How consistent are these different perspectives? Moreover, how robust are the findings of alternative tools or 
models and how much insight do such techniques offer in relation to the workings of transport improvements 
through the economy? Reconciling these approaches relies on assumptions made about the nature of competition in 
the economy and returns to scale. Relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale in perfectly competitive 
markets suggests potential for agglomeration effects and associated benefits not already captured in the user benefits. 
In addition, in the case of large scale investments, traditional demand forecasting approaches are unable to present 
adequately the range and size of changes in transport user behaviour. The tendency, certainly in the UK, has been to 
apply simple adjustments via a wider economic benefits multiplier to the user benefit results. The multiplier can be 
viewed as a surrogate for the price-cost mark-up associated with imperfect competition, the greater the imperfection 
in competition the greater the uncaptured benefits from a simple user benefits appraisal. Scale economies linked to 
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the existence of imperfect competition imply benefits would arise from and propensity for greater concentration of 
economic activity. 
Most macro-economic studies reflect an aggregate view of transport infrastructure, typically just using the 
volume of investment or stock of infrastructure capital as the variable which impacts on output, productivity or 
employment. Output-based models imply infrastructure working essentially as any other factor of production. The 
problem with such an approach is that it takes no account of how infrastructure is used by the activities within the 
economy in question. This is not particularly useful in appraising or evaluating transport programmes.  
Much has been written on the macro-evaluation of infrastructure in terms of its impact on productivity and 
growth, typically using some form of production function approach. The main issues to emerge are problems of 
measurement and the difficulty of making robust observations about impacts. An aggregate production function 
approach to transport infrastructure however does not adequately explain the mechanisms, generating problems of 
interpretation of the results arising from their use.  While aggregate econometric models have been found not to offer 
precise insights into the impacts of investment at a local level even advanced land use-transport interaction (LUTI) 
models or spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE) models bring with them their own challenges, notably 
ones of simplifying assumptions and/or  data requirements and their appropriateness for more modest programmes of 
spending. For instance, LUTI models tend to imply perfectly competitive markets. SCGE models have major 
drawbacks. Assumptions about equilibrium, the need for large data inputs from existing sources and the ‘black box’ 
nature of large models all limit their usefulness and ease of application. Moreover, market-based analytical tools 
offer limited insight into the effects of transport on the economy. They are unable to offer explanations of the 
underlying behavioural processes of firms and individuals.  
Most infrastructure investments will only affect the accessibility in the system as a whole in a marginal way. It is 
only where there is a major change in the system-wide accessibility that major relocation might take place.  Changes 
in accessibility tend to reinforce existing trends. However, two conflicting processes are operating: one through 
agglomeration factors promoting proximity; and the other in a well-connected society, non-proximity or 
diseconomies of agglomeration. With imperfect competition however, we need a more behavioural evaluation of the 
role of transport. The geographic scale of analysis also influences the apparent impact of transport and the 
significance of its constituent elements. Similarly the role that transport plays in providing locational advantage 
differs by spatial scale, type of company and time dependencies of product elements. Disaggregation spatially is a 
key element of informing our understanding of the impact which transport investment can have. This reinforces the 
need to look at more disaggregated models which allow for the differences between infrastructure type, sectors and 
employment structure. What is required is evidence of how changes to transport affect buying and selling activities 
at the disaggregate or micro-level, both between and within individual firms, and employees. There is a requirement 
to understand how firms organise and change their operations to reflect reduced transport costs, whether they 
concentrate all or some activities in a single location or various locations. For both the firm and the individual, 
improved transport enlarges their own labour market search.   
The principal lessons to be drawn from this review and experience with the Transport 21 investment programme 
in particular are decisions on major transport schemes should be assessed on a multimodal basis and informed 
through application of behaviourally sensitive disaggregate tools. Adding 60km of a high capacity road to Ireland’s 
Atlantic corridor with projected use of that capacity of no more than 25% by 2030 leaves questions about the 
efficacy of that spending unanswered.  The experience more generally with Transport 21 also points to a requirement 
for clearly defined objectives to be established, appraisal of schemes on the basis of comprehensive multimodal 
appraisal and evaluation and monitoring of major infrastructure projects. Procedures need to provide insights into the 
wider consequences of major investments in order to avoid falling foul of unintended consequences and ensure 
efficacy in the use of scarce public funds. It should not necessarily be those relatively simple projects which are so 
called ‘shovel ready’ that get rapid approval to proceed. We may be too ready to dig without fully appreciating the 
consequences of such actions. 
References 
Blinder, A. and Zandi, M. (2010) How the Great Recession was Brought to an End. Princeton University and Moody's Analytics. http:// 
www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/End-of-Great-Recession.pdf  
40   Austin Smyth et al. /  Transportation Research Procedia  8 ( 2015 )  29 – 40 
Chodorow-Reich  G. Laura Feiveson L., Liscow Z., and Gui Woolston W. (2012) Does State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase 
Employment? Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 4 No. 3. 
Congressional Research Service. (2011) The Role of Public Works Infrastructure in Economic Recovery, September 2011. 
Conley, T. and Dupor, B. (2011) The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Public Sector Jobs Saved, Private Sector Jobs Forestalled, Ohio 
State University Working Paper. 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) (2010) The Economic Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Fifth Quarterly 
Report, November 18. 
De Rugy, V. (2011) Federal Infrastructure Spending: Neither A Good Stimulus Nor A Good Investment, Speech to Joint Economic Committee, 
Hearing on the Impact of Infrastructure on the Manufacturing Sector, November 16, 2011. 
Department for Transport (2013a): Transport analysis guidance: WebTAG, October 2013.   
Department for Transport (2013b): The Transport Business Cases, January 2013.  
Department of Transport (2007): Guidelines on a Common Appraisal Framework for Transport Projects and Programmes, 2007. 
Executive Office of the President.  (2011) Recent Examples of the Economic Benefits from Investing in Infrastructure, Report prepared by the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the 
Treasury, November 2011. 
Feyrer, J. and Bruce Sacerdote, B.  (2011) Did the Stimulus Stimulate? Real Time Estimates of the Effects of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, Dartmouth College Working Paper. 
Gutiérrez, J., Condeço-Melhorado, A., Martín, J. C. (2011) Using accessibility indicators and GIS to assess spatial spillovers of transport 
infrastructure investment. Journal of Transport Geography. 
Graham, B.  (1998) Liberalization, regional economic development and the geography of demand for air transport in the European Union, Journal 
of Transport Geography,  6 (2) 87-104. 
Heintz, J., Pollin, R. and Garrett-Peltier, H. (2009) How Infrastructure Investments Support the U.S, Economy: Employment, Productivity, and 
Growth, Political Economy Research Institute and Alliance for American Manufacturing.  http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other. 
LeDuc, S. and Wilson, D.J. (2012) Roads to Prosperity or Bridges to Nowhere? Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Public Infrastructure 
Investment, Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco Working Paper Series Working Paper 2012-04.  
National Development Plan 2007-2013. Transforming Ireland: A Better Quality of Life for All Stationery Office Dublin 
National Spatial Strategy for Ireland: 2002-2020. 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation: 2014 Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance for Tiger Grant Applicants; Office of Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, Washington, DC 20590, 2014   
Page, B. and Reichling, F. (2011) Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output 
from January 2011 Through March 2011, Congressional Budget Office. 
Smyth A., Humphreys E. and S. Wood. (2010) T21 Midterm Review (2010) Report prepared on behalf of and published by Chartered Institute of 
Logistics and Transport (Ireland). 
Smyth A., (2006) Transporting Ireland – Assessing Transport 21’s Contribution to Meeting Ireland’s 21st Century Challenges – Report prepared 
on behalf of and published by CILTI, 2006. 
Taylor, J.B.  (2011) An Empirical Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activism in the 2000s, Journal of Economic Literature, 49:3, 686–702. 
US Department of The Treasury with The Council of Economic Advisers (2012) A New Economic Analysis of Infrastructure Investment, Report 
prepared March 2012.  
Vickerman, R. (1995)  Location, accessibility and regional development: the appraisal of trans-European networks, Transport Policy, 2 (4) 225-
234. 
Wilson, D.J. (2011) Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Federal Reserve Bank 
Of San Francisco Working Paper Series Working Paper 2010-17.  
